Agency theory and quality fade in buyer‐supplier relationships

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose using agency theory for assessing the likelihood of quality fade in buyer‐supplier relationships and prescribing contractual mechanisms for reducing quality fade. In this paper, quality fade, an element of supply chain vulnerability, is defined as the unforeseen deterioration of agreed to or expected quality levels with respect to product and/or service requirements. The use of outcome‐based, behavior‐based, or mix contracts can be used to reduce the likelihood of quality fade and illustrate preferred scenarios for buyer and suppliers.Design/methodology/approach – This paper proposes a conceptual model for using agency theory to explain and address a type of supply chain vulnerability called quality fade. A 2×2 matrix is proposed that contrasts outcome measurability with outcome uncertainty to illustrate buyer and supplier vulnerability and to suggest contractual mechanisms that can be used to mitigate vulnerability for both parties.Findings – A typology o...

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