Inefficiency of Equilibria in Query Auctions with Continuous Valuations
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Rudolf Müller | Dries Vermeulen | P. Jean-Jacques Herings | Elena Grigorieva | P. Herings | D. Vermeulen | R. Müller | E. Grigorieva | Dries Vermeulen
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