Incident Reviews in High-Hazard Industries: Sense Making and Learning Under Ambiguity and Accountability
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Mitchell Rogovin,et al. Three Mile Island : a report to the Commissioners and to the public , 1980 .
[2] J. Galegher,et al. Dimensional and Categorical Attributations in Expert Parole Decisions , 1982 .
[3] and G I Rochlin,et al. Nuclear Power Operations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective , 1994 .
[4] R. Daft,et al. Toward a Model of Organizations as Interpretation Systems , 1984 .
[5] Robert J. Thomas,et al. What machines can't do : politics and technology in the industrial enterprise , 1995 .
[6] Scott D. Sagan,et al. Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island. , 1995 .
[7] Gustavo Stubrich. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization , 1993 .
[8] J. Jasper,et al. Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, Sweden, and France. , 1991 .
[9] J. Shaoul. Human Error , 1973, Nature.
[10] P. White. Causal Processing: Origins and Development , 1988 .
[11] P. Slovic. Perception of risk. , 1987, Science.
[12] K. Weick. Organizational Culture as a Source of High Reliability , 1987 .
[13] P. Tetlock. Accountability: The neglected social context of judgment and choice. , 1985 .
[14] Constance Perin,et al. Organizations as Contexts: Implications for Safety Science and Practice , 1995 .
[15] Jens Rasmussen,et al. The role of error in organizing behaviour* , 1990 .
[16] Neville Moray. Human Factors Research and Nuclear Safety , 1989 .
[17] K. Weick,et al. Collective mind in organizations: Heedful interrelating on flight decks. , 1993 .
[18] Donald A. Schön,et al. Organizational Learning: A Theory Of Action Perspective , 1978 .
[19] J. Baron,et al. Outcome bias in decision evaluation. , 1988, Journal of personality and social psychology.
[20] J. Rasmussen. Why do complex organizational systems fail , 1989 .
[21] 長沢 信方. Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island; The Need for Change; The Legacy of TMI, Washington, DC., 1979, Pergamon Press, New York and Oxford, (1979), ix+201ページ, 28×21.5cm, 4,650円. , 1980 .
[22] M. Seligman,et al. Learned helplessness in humans: critique and reformulation. , 1978, Journal of abnormal psychology.
[23] B. Fischhoff,et al. Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence. , 1977 .
[24] J. Sterman,et al. Systems thinking and organizational learning: Acting locally and thinking globally in the organization of the future , 1992 .
[25] Henry Petroski,et al. To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design , 1986 .
[26] J. Pfeffer,et al. Who gets power — and how they hold on to it: A strategic-contingency model of power , 1977 .
[27] S. Chaiken,et al. Promoting systematic processing in low-motivation settings: effect of incongruent information on processing and judgment. , 1991, Journal of personality and social psychology.
[28] David Woods,et al. Behind human error : cognitive systems, computers, and hindsight : state-of-the-art report , 1994 .
[29] R. Hastie. Causes and effects of causal attribution , 1984 .
[30] J. Carroll. The Organizational Context for Decision Making in High-Hazard Industries , 1994 .
[31] Alfred A. Marcus,et al. 5. Playing the Maintenance Game: How Mental Models Drive Organizational Decisions , 2018, Debating Rationality.
[32] Richard L. Daft,et al. Organizational information requirements, media richness and structural design , 1986 .
[33] Barry M. Staw,et al. The Trapped Administrator: Effects of Job Insecurity and Policy Resistance upon Commitment to a Course of Action. , 1979 .
[34] Jonathan Baron,et al. Ambiguity and rationality , 1988 .
[35] J. Sterman. Misperceptions of feedback in dynamic decision making , 1989 .
[36] S. Sitkin. Learning Through Failure : The Strategy of Small Losses , 1992 .
[37] E. E. Jones,et al. The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. , 1972 .
[38] G. Loewenstein. The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation. , 1994 .
[39] J. Klayman,et al. Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Informa-tion in Hypothesis Testing , 1987 .
[40] L. Ruecker,et al. A framework for incorporating best practices at nuclear power plants , 1992, IEEE Conference on Nuclear Science Symposium and Medical Imaging.
[41] P. Brickman,et al. Causal chains: Attribution of responsibility as a function of immediate and prior causes. , 1975 .
[42] Eugene A. Rosa,et al. Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, Sweden, and France. , 1990 .
[43] C. Batson,et al. Attributional Bias in Counselors' Diagnoses: The Effect of Resources1 , 1979 .
[44] Edward M. Hundert,et al. The Cement of the Universe , 1990 .
[45] L. Ross,et al. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. , 1981 .
[46] D. Hilton. Conversational processes and causal explanation. , 1990 .
[47] Erik Hollnagel. Mental models and model mentality , 1988 .
[48] William R. Freudenburg. Nothing Recedes Like Success - Risk Analysis and the Organizational Amplification of Risks , 1992 .
[49] B. Fischhoff,et al. Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty. , 1975 .
[50] John S. Carroll. Mental models and learning from experience in nuclear power plants , 1992 .
[51] Henry Mintzberg,et al. The Structure of "Unstructured" Decision Processes , 1976 .