Symmetric Decomposition of Asymmetric Games
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Shane Legg | Rahul Savani | Joel Z. Leibo | Thore Graepel | Karl Tuyls | Marc Lanctot | Georg Ostrovski | Toby Ord | Julien Pérolat | Georg Ostrovski | S. Legg | T. Graepel | Marc Lanctot | K. Tuyls | J. Pérolat | Rahul Savani | Toby Ord
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