论文信息 - Focal Points in Framed Strategic Forms

Focal Points in Framed Strategic Forms

Only recently have attempts been made to formalize the idea of salience that underlies static focal points. Bacharach, Sugden, and Janssen formalize the players' descriptions of the strategies and, in many cases, derive focal points and salience in an intuitive way. However, these approaches apply to special classes of games only and leave some subtle kinds of salience unexplained. In order to overcome these limitations framed strategic forms together with a language invariance requirement on their solutions are proposed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

André Casajus | André Casajus

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