THE ECONOMIC REASONS FOR PRICE AND ENTRY REGULATION OF TAXICABS. A COMMENT
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The author comments on papers recently published by Shreiber in which he supplied a model of determination of price and waiting time in unregulated taxicab markets, which he concludes would produce a large number of cabs, a short waiting time for customers, and high fares. It is suggested that Shreiber provides insufficient information and data to support his model, and that the lack of information for consumers and suppliers, necessary for the functioning of his cruising market, is no problem in practice. The assumptions necessary for Shreiber's model to hold true are listed and the author describes the failure of these assumptions and concludes that there is little need to regulate price or entry citing examples of unregulated taxi markets in both entry (Washington, London, Honolulu) and price (a number of towns in Wisconsin). (TRRL)
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