Influences on the Size and Scope of Networks for Social Service Delivery

Local social service agencies throughout the world have begun encouraging or requiring social service providers to form community-based networks for the delivery of publicly funded social services. Little is known, however, about the nature of the resulting networks. In this article we develop a model of organizational, programmatic, and community influences on the size and scope of interorganizational networks for social service delivery. We then apply this theoretical framework to an empirical study of service delivery networks in the Family Preservation Program in Los Angeles County. Our findings suggest that the availability of potential partners in the community, the scope of required services, and the ethnic homogeneity of the client population are key determinants of network size. We develop the implications of the results for theories of partnership formation and for more effective management of network formation processes.

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