On the diffuseness of incomplete information game

We introduce the “relative diffuseness” assumption to characterize the differences between payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant diffuseness of information. Based on this assumption, the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with incomplete information and general action spaces can be obtained. Moreover, we introduce a new notion of “undistinguishable purification” which strengthens the standard purification concept, and its existence follows from the relative diffuseness assumption.

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