Quantitative Questions on Attack-Defense Trees

Attack---defense trees are a novel methodology for graphical security modeling and assessment. The methodology includes intuitive and formal components that can be used for quantitative analysis of attack---defense scenarios. In practice, we use intuitive questions to ask about aspects of scenarios we are interested in. Formally, a computational procedure, using a bottom-up algorithm, is applied to derive the corresponding numerical values. This paper bridges the gap between the intuitive and the formal way of quantitatively assessing attack---defense scenarios. We discuss how to properly specify a question, so that it can be answered unambiguously. Given a well-specified question, we then show how to derive an appropriate attribute domain which constitutes the corresponding formal model.

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