A Budget Feasible Incentive Mechanism for Weighted Coverage Maximization in Mobile Crowdsensing
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Shaojie Tang | Guihai Chen | Zhenzhe Zheng | Fan Wu | Xiaofeng Gao | Hongzi Zhu | Hongzi Zhu | Shaojie Tang | Fan Wu | Guihai Chen | Zhenzhe Zheng | Xiaofeng Gao
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