The Severity of Contract Enforcement in Interfirm Channel Relationships

Little is known about how channel members react to violations of explicit contracts. The authors develop and test an integrative conceptual framework that focuses on the severity of the enforcement response in channel relationships. The empirical results provide evidence of discerning enforcement practices by channel members, reflecting channel system, network, and dyadic concerns.

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