AUTHENTICATION OF MONITORING SYSTEMS FOR NON-PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL

Radiation measurement and monitoring systems are central to the affirmation of compliance with nuclear material control agreements associated with a variety of arms control and nonproliferation regimes. A number of radiation measurement and monitoring systems are under development for this purpose, and the correct functioning of these systems need to be authenticated. Authentication can be operationally described as the process by which a Monitoring Party to an agreement is assured that measurement systems are assembled as designed, function as designed, and do not contain hidden features that allow the passing of material inconsistent with an accepted declaration. 1. INTRODUCTION Authentication of monitoring instrumentation has taken on new importance because of the conditions of Host-supply and the use of information barriers required for observation of sensitive material. The end of the Cold War has resulted in unprecedented arms control agreements and Transparency Initiatives between the US and the countries of the former Soviet Union to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and to safeguard the dismantled fissile materials. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the US Congress enacted the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program (originally called the Nunn-Lugar Initiative) to assist former Soviet Union countries in enhancing the safety, security, control, accounting, and centralization of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The US Department of Energy, through the MPC&A Program, and the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, through the Fissile Material Control Program, commonly work toward the CTR goals. Bilateral non-proliferation and arms-control agreements and negotiations held between the US and the Russian Federation (RF) are leading to the joint disposition of nuclear weapons material and the deactivation and decommissioning of production and processing facilities. A new population of material is being stored that has originated from the nuclear weapons programs, which will place new requirements upon information security and authentication beyond those of the traditional safeguards process. The plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) material from these efforts will ultimately be processed into reactor fuel or be buried with highly radioactive waste. Agreements generally involve some level of transparency, where a Monitoring Party enters a Host Party facility to gain confidence that the conditions of the agreement are being satisfied. A number of radiation measurement systems are under development for use in potential confidence building activities. Certification, demonstration of operational functionality, and authentication are all required for a viable measurement system.