Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory

This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of three solutions, the Shapley value for n agents, the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents and the per capita nucleolus. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud, the random arrival and the adjusted proportional rules.

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