Compositional Hazard Analysis of UML Component and Deployment Models

The general trend towards complex technical systems with embedded software results in an increasing demand for dependable high quality software. The UML as an advanced object-oriented technology provides in principle the essential concepts which are required to handle the increasing complexity of these safety-critical software systems. However, the current and forthcoming UML versions do not directly apply to the outlined problem. Available hazard analysis techniques on the other hand do not provide the required degree of integration with software design notations. To narrow the gap between safety-critical system development and UML techniques, the presented approach supports the compositional hazard analysis of UML models described by restricted component and deployment diagrams. The approach permits to systematically identify which hazards and failures are most serious, which components or set of components require a more detailed safety analysis, and which restrictions to the failure propagation are assumed in the UML design.

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