Accounting for Enron: Shareholder Value and Stakeholder Interests

The catastrophe caused by the failure of Enron could not compare with the damage this company would have caused if it had succeeded. The relentless emphasis on the importance of shareholder value in recent times has created the conditions for the disconnection of corporations such as Enron from their essential moral underpinnings, encouraging them to concentrate exclusively on financial performance, and to neglect not just the wider stakeholder interests of customers and employees, but the essential interests of the economies and communities in which they operate. The problem with established economic theories of corporate governance is that they misconceive the irreducible core of corporate governance, at the same time as underestimating the complexity of the phenomenon. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005.

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