Prejudices, presuppositions, and the theory of counterfactuals

O Two theories of truth for counterfactual conditionals are developed. Both differ from current theories in that their explanations do not stop at the level of a comparative similarity relation of worlds. They differ from one another in that the first one traces comparative similarity, and with it counterfactual truth, back to the beliefs of a speaker, whereas the second one takes the knowledge of a speaker as its starting point. It is argued that the first theory is preferable to the second one, and that both these clear-cut 'coherence' theories are preferable to any, necessarily vague, 'correspondence'theory. Turning, then, to questions of presupposition it is shown that a counterfactual conditional can be used appropriately only if its antecedent is believed to be false. This necessary condition for the conversational correctness of a counterfactual statement is discussed in detail, and an attempt is made to justify it in view of some maxims of conversation. Logics are discussed in an appendix.