Dynamic contracts with partial observations: Application to indirect load control

This paper proposes a method to design an optimal dynamic contract between a principal and an agent, who has the authority to control both the principal's revenue and an engineered system. The key characteristic of our problem setting is that the principal has very limited information: the principal has no capability to monitor the agent's control or the state of the engineered system. The agent has perfect observations. With this asymmetry of information, we show that the principal can induce the agent to control both the revenue and the system processes in a way that maximizes the principal's utility, if the principal offers appropriate realtime and end-time compensation. We reformulate the dynamic contract design problem as a stochastic optimal control of both the engineered system and the agent's future expected payoff, which can be numerically solved using an associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The performance and usefulness of the proposed contract are demonstrated with an indirect load control problem.

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