论文信息 - ON THE PRICING OF UNSEASONED EQUITY ISSUES: 1965-1969

ON THE PRICING OF UNSEASONED EQUITY ISSUES: 1965-1969

Recent research focused on the market for first public offerings of common stock has indicated that investors who purchase new issues at the offering price will quickly achieve relatively large systematic profits. This is attributable to either the inability or the reluctance of investment bankers to reoffer the shares in which they deal at market-clearing prices. This paper examines factors that influence investment bankers in their pricing decisions and subsequently determine the short-run performance of new issues.

Dennis E. Logue | D. Logue

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