论文信息 - Optimization and mechanism design

Optimization and mechanism design

Mechanism design is about optimizing the allocation of resources when the parameters needed to determine an optimal allocation are privately held by the agents who will consume the resources. An agent’s report of her information will influence the resulting allocation which in turn will affect her utility. In such a situation, how can one simultaneously elicit the information that is privately held and choose the optimal allocation? This paper illustrates how standard results in linear programming play a role in the analysis of mechanism design problems. It is not a comprehensive survey. Rather, it focuses on two variations of a particular problem: the allocation of a single object.

Rakesh V. Vohra | R. Vohra

[1] Awi Federgruen,et al. Polymatroidal flow network models with multiple sinks , 1988, Networks.

[2] Rakesh V. Vohra,et al. Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers , 2008, J. Econ. Theory.

[3] Yeon-Koo Che,et al. Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach , 2013 .

[4] Kim C. Border. IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCED FORM AUCTIONS: A GEOMETRIC APPROACH , 1991 .

[5] H. Groenevelt. Two algorithms for maximizing a separable concave function over a polymatroid feasible region , 1991 .

[6] James A. Reeds,et al. Existence of Probability Measures With Given Marginals , 1991 .

[7] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[8] Kim C. Border. Reduced Form Auctions Revisited , 2007 .

[9] Eddie Dekel,et al. Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification , 2012 .

[10] M. Harris,et al. ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND THE DESIGN OF AUCTIONS , 1981 .

[11] Steven A. Matthews. On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions , 1984 .

[12] Benny Moldovanu,et al. Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation Revisited , 2011 .

[13] R. Vohra. Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach , 2011 .

[14] J. Goeree,et al. On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in a General Class of Social Choice Problems , 2011 .

[15] J. Laffont,et al. Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers , 1996 .

[16] A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms , 2008 .