Abstract : Since fiscal year 2000, the Department of Defense (DoD) has significantly increased the number of major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. However, acquisition outcomes have not improved. Over the next 5 years, DoD expects to invest $357 billion on the development and procurement of major defense acquisition programs and billions more on their operation and maintenance. Last year, we reported that the total acquisition cost of DoD's portfolio of major defense programs under development or in production has grown by $295 billion (in fiscal year 2008 dollars). In most cases, the programs we assessed failed to deliver capabilities when promised -- often forcing warfighters to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. Continued cost growth results in less funding being available for other DoD priorities and programs, while continued failure to deliver weapon systems on time delays providing critical capabilities to the warfighter. This testimony describes the systemic problems that have contributed to poor cost and schedule outcomes in DoD's acquisition of major weapon systems; recent actions DoD has taken to address these problems; and steps that Congress and DoD need to take to improve the future performance of DoD's major weapon programs. The testimony is drawn from GAO's body of work on DoD's acquisition, requirements, and funding processes.