Innovation Contests
暂无分享,去创建一个
Kathrin M. Möslein | Angelika C. Bullinger-Hoffmann | Jörg Haller | Angelika C. Bullinger-Hoffmann | Jörg Haller
[1] Nirvikar Singh,et al. Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort , 2001 .
[2] Ian L. Gale,et al. Optimal Design of Research Contests , 2003 .
[3] Michael R. Baye,et al. The all-pay auction with complete information , 1990 .
[4] Johann Füller,et al. Community based innovation: How to integrate members of virtual communities into new product development , 2006, Electron. Commer. Res..
[5] Kai A. Konrad,et al. Strategy and Dynamics in Contests , 2009 .
[6] René Kirkegaard,et al. Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps , 2010, Games Econ. Behav..
[7] Eyal Winter. Incentives and Discrimination , 2004 .
[8] F. Hayek. The economic nature of the firm: The use of knowledge in society , 1945 .
[9] Wolfgang Leininger,et al. Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case , 1996 .
[10] Ulrike Lechner,et al. The Ideas Competition as Tool of Change Management - Aspects of Triggering Ideas , 2009, AMCIS.
[11] S. Scotchmer,et al. Innovation and Incentives , 2004 .
[12] David Wettstein,et al. Innovative Activity and Sunk Cost , 2003 .
[13] Richard G. Newell,et al. Technology Prizes for Climate Change Mitigation , 2005 .
[14] Ron Siegel,et al. All-Pay Contests , 2009 .
[15] A. Bullinger,et al. Community-Based Innovation Contests: Where Competition Meets Cooperation , 2010 .
[16] Richard G. Newell,et al. A U.S. Innovation Strategy for Climate Change Mitigation , 2008 .
[17] James Surowiecki. The wisdom of crowds: Why the many are smarter than the few and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies, and nations Doubleday Books. , 2004 .
[18] Dominik Walcher,et al. Toolkits for Idea Competitions: A Novel Method to Integrate Users in New Product Development , 2006 .
[19] Derek J. Clark,et al. Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game , 2000 .
[20] Steven D. Levitt,et al. Optimal Incentive Schemes When Only the Agents' "Best" Output Matters to the Principal , 1995 .
[21] Michael R. Baye,et al. Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction , 1993 .
[22] Curtis R. Taylor. Digging for golden carrots: an analysis of research tournaments , 1995 .
[23] Fred Martin,et al. A Toolkit for Learning: Technology of the MIT LEGO Robot Design Competition , 1996 .
[24] B. Moldovanu,et al. The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests , 2001 .
[25] J. Morgan,et al. An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction , 1997 .
[26] René Kirkegaard. Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All-Pay Auction , 2010 .
[27] Jan Marco Leimeister,et al. Leveraging crowdsourcing – activationsupporting components for IT-based idea competitions , 2009 .
[28] Cheng-Zhong Qin,et al. How to Motivate Innovation : Subsidies or Prizes ? , 2009 .
[29] Jan Marco Leimeister,et al. Leveraging Crowdsourcing: Activation-Supporting Components for IT-Based Ideas Competition , 2009, J. Manag. Inf. Syst..
[30] A. Bullinger,et al. Integrating Inside and Outside Innovators: A Sociotechnical Systems Perspective , 2009 .
[31] Ron Siegel. Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments , 2010 .