Bringing the owners back in: An analysis of a 3-mode interlock network

Abstract This paper examines the association between ownership and director interlocks in Swedish big business during the period 1990–2005. By analyses of the 3-mode network of owners, firms, and directors, multiple director assignments are shown to be highly dependent on owner interlocks. The findings provide a new understanding of the mechanisms behind the formation of director interlocks. Furthermore, the association between the interlock types suggests that the ownership network may potentially (co-)produce some of the phenomena that have been attributed to the director network. Future analyses of director interlocks have to bring the owners back in.

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