On the Economics of International Fisheries

Publisher Summary This chapter presents a very general model of fishing and then describes four sets of conditions under each of which there is a socially optimal Nash equilibrium path, that is, a path along which commonality of access does not matter. By perturbing, the conditions conclusions of a traditional or nontraditional kind can be generated. It has long been believed that when several countries share access to a fishery, the total catch is suboptimal. The traditional view is valid under a variety of institutional arrangements and solution concepts. In direct commonality, each country enjoys immediate access to the entire fish population and adopts a feedback or perfect closed-loop solution-concept. In indirect commonality, each country has immediate access only to the fish population in its coastal waters but not in which fish move across international boundaries from the regions of high population density to the regions of low density. The indirect commonality adopts an open-loop solution-concept.