论文信息 - Implementing Coordinated Team Play

Implementing Coordinated Team Play

Abstract This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting makes use of at-will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.

Anil Arya | John S. Hughes | Jonathan Glover | Anil Arya | Jonathan C. Glover

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