Clock Games: Theory and Experiments
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Stephen Morris. Co-Operation and Timing , 1995 .
[2] M. Shubik. The Dollar Auction game: a paradox in noncooperative behavior and escalation , 1971 .
[3] J. Harrington. A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game , 1989 .
[4] R. McKelvey,et al. An experimental study of the centipede game , 1992 .
[5] Michael R. Baye,et al. Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction , 1993 .
[6] C. Cannings,et al. The Generalized War of Attrition , 1997 .
[7] R. Nagel,et al. THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION , 2004 .
[8] Russell J. Lundholm,et al. Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions , 1995, Journal of Political Economy.
[9] D. Fudenberg,et al. A Theory of Exit in Duopoly , 1986 .
[10] M. Dufwenberg. Game theory. , 2011, Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science.
[11] J. Vickers,et al. Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race , 1985 .
[12] Charles S. Myers,et al. On reaction times. , 1909 .
[13] Jutta A. Dönges. Theory of Global Games , 2001 .
[14] J. C. Burkill,et al. A mathematician's miscellany , 1954 .
[15] Markus K. Brunnermeier,et al. Clock Games: Theory and Experiments , 2004 .
[16] M. Obstfeld. Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features , 1995 .
[17] Charles A. Holt,et al. Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma? , 1999 .
[18] E. Kummer,et al. Über die hypergeometrische Reihe . , 1836 .
[19] A. Cabrales,et al. Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study , 2002 .
[20] Markus K. Brunnermeier,et al. Synchronization risk and delayed arbitrage , 2002 .
[21] SATORU KUDOSE,et al. TRAVELER’S DILEMMA , 2007 .
[22] Douglas Gale,et al. Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment , 1994 .
[23] Michael H. Riordan,et al. Regulation and Preemptive Technology Adoption , 1992 .
[24] R. Rosenthal. Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox , 1981 .
[25] Jonathan D. Levin. Bubbles and Crashes , 2006 .
[26] Francesco Squintani,et al. Preemption Games with Private Information , 2011 .
[27] Frank Heinemann,et al. American Economic Association Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks : Comment , 2015 .
[28] R. McKelvey,et al. Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games , 1995 .
[29] M. Abramowitz,et al. Handbook of Mathematical Functions With Formulas, Graphs and Mathematical Tables (National Bureau of Standards Applied Mathematics Series No. 55) , 1965 .
[30] H. Carlsson,et al. Global Games and Equilibrium Selection , 1993 .
[31] Wolfgang Leininger,et al. Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations , 1989 .
[32] Jianbo Zhang. Strategic Delay and the Onset of Investment Cascades , 1997 .
[33] Jennifer F. Reinganum. Dynamic games of innovation , 1981 .
[34] B. O'Neill. International Escalation and the Dollar Auction , 1986 .
[35] Lones Smith,et al. Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph from One Form to Another , 2007 .
[36] W. N. Bailey. Confluent Hypergeometric Functions , 1960, Nature.