Economic Modeling in Networking: A Primer

In recent years, engineers have been increasingly called upon to have basic skills in economic modeling and game theory at their disposal for two related reasons. First, the economics of networks has a significant effect on the adoption and creation of network innovations, and second, and perhaps more importantly, engineered networks serve as the platform for many of our basic economic interactions today. This monograph aims to provide engineering students who have a basic training in economic modeling and game theory an understanding of where and when game theoretic models are employed, the assumptions underpinning key models, and conceptual insights that are broadly applicable. Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1300000011

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