Stock Market Manipulations

We present theory and evidence of stock price manipulation. Manipulators trade in the presence of other traders seeking information about the stock's true value. More information seekers imply greater competition for shares, making it easier for manipulators to trade and potentially worsening market efficiency. Data from SEC enforcement actions show that manipulators typically are plausibly informed parties (insiders, brokers, etc.). Manipulation increases volatility, liquidity, and returns. Prices rise throughout the manipulation period and fall postmanipulation. Prices and liquidity are higher when manipulators sell than when they buy. When manipulators sell, prices are higher when liquidity and volatility are greater.

[1]  John J. Merrick,et al.  Strategic trading behavior and price distortion in a manipulated market: anatomy of a squeeze ☆ , 2005 .

[2]  Guojun Wu,et al.  Behavior Based Manipulation: Theory and Prosecution Evidence , 2004 .

[3]  Itay Goldstein,et al.  Manipulation, the Allocational Role of Prices and Manipulation, the Allocational Role of Prices and Production Externalities , 2003 .

[4]  Michael Lewis Next: The Future Just Happened , 2001 .

[5]  Paolo Vitale,et al.  Speculative noise trading and manipulation in the foreign exchange market , 2000 .

[6]  Karl Felixson,et al.  Day end returns--stock price manipulation , 1999 .

[7]  P. Mahoney,et al.  The stock pools and the Securities Exchange Act 1 I thank two anonymous referees, the editor, Willia , 1999 .

[8]  Charles M. C. Lee,et al.  Price Momentum and Trading Volume , 1998 .

[9]  Maureen O'Hara,et al.  Market Microstructure Theory , 1995 .

[10]  R. Jarrow Derivative Security Markets, Market Manipulation, and Option Pricing Theory , 1994, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.

[11]  Bruno Gerard,et al.  Trading and Manipulation Around Seasoned Equity Offerings , 1993 .

[12]  Robert A. Jarrow,et al.  Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, and Short Squeezes , 1992, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.

[13]  Franklin Allen,et al.  Stock-Price Manipulation , 1992 .

[14]  Franklin Allen,et al.  Stock Price Manipulation, Market Microstructure and Asymmetric Information , 1991 .

[15]  Albert S. Kyle,et al.  Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition , 1989 .

[16]  Maureen O'Hara,et al.  PRICE, TRADE SIZE, AND INFORMATION IN SECURITIES MARKETS* , 1987 .

[17]  A. Kyle Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading , 1985 .

[18]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders , 1985 .

[19]  Carl E. Walter,et al.  Privatizing China: The Stock Markets and Their Role In Corporate Reform , 2003 .

[20]  Bradford D. Jordan,et al.  Salomon brothers and the May 1991 Treasury auction: Analysis of a market corner , 1996 .

[21]  R. Farnsworth,et al.  O'Hara, Maureen , 1984 .