Tradable permit approaches to pollution control - Faustian bargain or paradise regained?

One of the central tenets of a property rights approach to environmental protection holds not only that people respond to incentives, but also that the structure of entitlements conveyed by property rights affects incentives. It follows that a careful study of entitlements in various environmental contexts can provide a foundation for greater understanding about why human behavior can be so environmentally destructive. Perhaps even more importantly, however, it also provides a basis for changing the environmentally destructive incentives by changing the entitlements.

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