Cutting Through the Emissions: Feature Selection from Electromagnetic Side-Channel Data for Activity Detection

Abstract Electromagnetic side-channel analysis (EM-SCA) has been used as a window to eavesdrop on computing devices for information security purposes. It has recently been proposed to use as a digital evidence acquisition method in forensic investigation scenarios as well. The massive amount of data produced by EM signal acquisition devices makes it difficult to process in real-time making on-site EM-SCA infeasible. Uncertainty surrounds the precise information leaking frequency channel demanding the acquisition of signals over a wide bandwidth. As a consequence, investigators are left with a large number of potential frequency channels to be inspected; with many not containing any useful information leakages. The identification of a small subset of frequency channels that leak a sufficient amount of information can significantly boost the performance enabling real-time analysis. This work presents a systematic methodology to identify information leaking frequency channels from high dimensional EM data with the help of multiple filtering techniques and machine learning algorithms. The evaluations show that it is possible to narrow down the number of frequency channels from over 20,000 to less than a hundred (81 channels). The experiments presented show an accuracy of 0.9315 when all the 20,000 channels are used, an accuracy of 0.9395 with the highest 500 channels after calculating the variance between the average value of each class, and an accuracy of 0.9047 when the best 81 channels according to Recursive Feature Elimination are considered.

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