The tradeoff between technology and prescreening intelligence in checked baggage screening for aviation security

The Transportation Security Administration believes selective screening of aviation passengers may result in better security at airports in the United States. Under selective screening, passengers are prescreened using passenger information to determine the degree of risk that each passenger poses). This degree of risk is then used to determine the amount of security resources appropriate for that passenger. How to determine this degree of risk and the information that should be used are controversial topics, as evidenced by the large amounts of discussion concerning CAPPS and Secure Flight. This paper examines selective checked baggage screening systems that use a prescreening system and two types of baggage screening devices, one to screen checked baggage of passengers perceived as lower-risk and the other to screen checked baggage of passengers perceived as higher-risk. This paper reports a cost-benefit analysis of such selective checked baggage screening systems. The analysis is performed for several scenarios that consider various levels of accuracy of prescreening systems in assessing passenger risk. The results indicate that the accuracy of the prescreening system in assessing passenger risk is more important for reducing the number of successful attacks than the effectiveness of the checked baggage screening devices at detecting threats when few passengers are classified as higher-risk. Moreover, several selective screening scenarios are identified that may be preferable to current checked baggage screening strategies.

[1]  Sheldon H. Jacobson,et al.  Outgoing selectee rates at hub airports , 2002, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf..

[2]  Aaron Strauss,et al.  Carnival Booth: An Algorithm for Defeating the Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening System , 2002, First Monday.

[3]  Peter Carstensen,et al.  The Lamppost, the Wizard, and the Law: Reflections on Professor Barnett's Assessment of CAPPS II , 2004, Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis.

[4]  Sheldon Howard Jacobson,et al.  Modeling and analyzing the performance of aviation security systems using baggage value performance measures , 2001 .

[5]  Arnold Barnett,et al.  CAPPS II: The Foundation of Aviation Security? , 2004, Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis.

[6]  Itzhak Ravid Safety versus defense: comments on "CAPPS II: the foundation of aviation security?". , 2004, Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis.

[7]  Sheldon Howard Jacobson,et al.  Modeling aviation baggage screening security systems: a case study , 2003 .

[8]  Robert W Poole,et al.  A Risk-based Airport Security Policy , 2003 .

[9]  Sheldon Howard Jacobson,et al.  A multilevel passenger screening problem for aviation security , 2006 .

[10]  Sheldon Howard Jacobson,et al.  Assessing the impact of deterrence on aviation checked baggage screening strategies , 2005 .

[11]  Julie L Virta,et al.  Analyzing the cost of screening selectee and non-selectee baggage. , 2003, Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis.

[12]  Jonathan P Caulkins,et al.  CAPPS II: A Risky Choice Concerning an Untested Risk Detection Technology , 2004, Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis.