Inferring Utilities from Negotiation Actions

In this paper we propose to model a negotiator’s decision-ma king behavior, expressed as preferences between an offer/counter-offer gamble and a certain offer, by learning from implicit choices that can be inferred from observed negotiation actions. The agent’s acti ons in a negotiation sequence provide information about his preferences and risk-taking behavior. We show how offers and counter-offers in negotiation can be transformed into gamble questions providing a basis for inf erring implicit preferences. Finally, we present the results of experiments and evaluation we have undertake n.

[1]  Alvin E. Roth,et al.  The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model , 1985 .

[2]  E. Durfee,et al.  The Impact of Nested Agent Models in an Information Economy , 1996 .

[3]  F. Zeuthen.  Problems of monopoly and economic warfare , 1930 .

[4]  Peter Haddawy,et al.  Preference Elicitation via Theory Refinement , 2003, J. Mach. Learn. Res..

[5]  L. J. Savage.  Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations , 1971 .

[6]  Jude W. Shavlik,et al.  Knowledge-Based Artificial Neural Networks , 1994, Artif. Intell..

[7]  Daphne Koller,et al.  Learning an Agent's Utility Function by Observing Behavior , 2001, ICML.

[8]  Takuji Nishimura,et al.  Mersenne twister: a 623-dimensionally equidistributed uniform pseudo-random number generator , 1998, TOMC.

[9]  Pattie Maes,et al.  Agents that buy and sell , 1999, CACM.

[10]  Peter Haddawy,et al.  Eliciting Utilities by Refining Theories of Monotonicity and Risk , 2002 .

[11]  Svetha Venkatesh,et al.  Learning Other Agents' Preferences in Multi-Agent Negotiation Using the Bayesian Classifier , 1999, Int. J. Cooperative Inf. Syst..

[12]  Alvin E. Roth,et al.  Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes , 1982 .

[13]  Katia P. Sycara,et al.  Bayesian learning in negotiation , 1998, Int. J. Hum. Comput. Stud..

[14]  F. B. Vernadat,et al.  Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs , 1994 .

[15]  A. Rubinstein.  A BARGAINING MODEL WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT TIME PREFERENCES , 1985 .

[16]  A. Rubinstein.  Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model , 1982 .

[17]  J. Nash.  THE BARGAINING PROBLEM , 1950, Classics in Game Theory.