The Disadvantages of Free MIX Routes and how to Overcome Them

There are different methods to build an anonymity service using MIXes. A substantial decision for doing so is the method of choosing the MIX route. In this paper we compare two special configurations: a fixed MIX route used by all participants and a network of freely usable MIXes where each participant chooses his own route. The advantages and disadvantages in respect to the freedom of choice are presented and examined. We'll show that some additional attacks are possible in networks with freely chosen MIX routes. After describing these attacks, we estimate their impact on the achievable degree of anonymity. Finally, we evaluate the relevance of the described attacks with respect to existing systems like e.g. Mixmaster, Crowds, and Freedom.

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