On the relative strictness of negative and positive duties.

"O ECENTLY a number of philosophical dis -*^cussions have appeared in which the question of whether we have a greater duty to refrain from injuring people than to bring them aid is considered. In particular, they have centered about the question whether we have a greater duty to refrain from taking life than we have to save life. In this dis? cussion I will consider in what sense (if any) it could be said that negative duties are stricter than positive duties and, more specifically, whether there is any sense in which the duty to refrain from killing someone is stricter than the duty to save someone. I will conclude that in an important sense negative duties are not stricter than positive duties. I will consider various examples and arguments that would seem to count against my conclusion. It can be shown, I think, that absurd consequences result if the refraining from injuring/bringing aid distinction is taken to have moral significance in itself. Other principles are available to account for the intuitive judgments we make in those cases generally thought to support the claim that nega? tive duties are stricter than positive ones. Not only will such principles be offered but arguments in support of the claim that negative duties are stricter than positive duties will be criticized and found wanting.