Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to the Problems of Development

The upper-income, advanced industrial countries of the world today all have market economies with open competition, competitive multi-party democratic political systems, and a secure government monopoly over violence. Such open access orders, however, are not the only norm and equilibrium type of society. The middle and low-income developing countries today, like all countries before about 1800, can be understood as limited access orders that maintain their equilibrium in a fundamentally different way. In limited access orders, the state does not have a secure monopoly on violence, and society organizes itself to control violence among the elite factions. A common feature of limited access orders is that political elites divide up control of the economy, each getting some share of the rents. Since outbreaks of violence reduce the rents, the elite factions have incentives to be peaceable most of the time. Adequate stability of the rents and thus of the social order requires limiting access and competition-hence a social order with a fundamentally different logic than the open access order. This paper lays out such a framework and explores some of its implications for the problems of development today.

[1]  D. Landes The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor , 1995 .

[2]  A. Cukierman,et al.  Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes , 1992 .

[3]  R. Tollison,et al.  Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society , 1982 .

[4]  B. Parekh Theory of the State , 1989 .

[5]  David B. Abernethy The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980 , 2000 .

[6]  J. Goldstone Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 , 1991 .

[7]  Randolph M. Siverson,et al.  The Logic of Political Survival , 2003 .

[8]  B. Klein,et al.  The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance , 1981, Journal of Political Economy.

[9]  Joel Mokyr,et al.  The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress , 1991 .

[10]  Jstor The American political science review , 2022 .

[11]  David L. Dollar Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality Since 1980 , 2004 .

[12]  Gene M. Grossman,et al.  Special Interest Politics , 2001 .

[13]  J. Wallis Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852 , 2005, The Journal of Economic History.

[14]  Johan Caspar Bluntschli The theory of the state , 1875 .

[15]  Margaret Levi,et al.  Of Rule and Revenue , 1991 .

[16]  V. Durairaj The bottom billion: why are the poorest countries failing and what can be done about it , 2007 .

[17]  David S. Landes,et al.  The Unbound Prometheus , 1969 .

[18]  V. Lenin,et al.  Imperialism : The Highest Stage of Capitalism , 2010 .

[19]  Democracy, Dictatorship and Development , 1990 .

[20]  Mushtaq H Khan State Failure in Developing Countries and Institutional Reform Strategies , 2004 .

[21]  P. Kilby Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (Eds.), Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia , 2001 .