Concentrating Correctly on Cybercrime Concentration

We review the cybercrime literature to draw attention to the many occasions on which authors have identified concentrations within criminal activity. We note that the existence of concentrations often leads authors to suggest that concentrations, or ‘choke points’ are amenable to effective intervention. We then discuss the reasons that concentrations are observed – it is often the result of the criminals being economically efficient, but there are other possible explanations. We then set out a methodology for establishing whether a specific concentration might be the opportunity for a successful intervention. We also argue that the mere possibility of a successful intervention on a specific concentration point does not necessarily mean that incentives of the various stakeholders will be sufficiently well aligned for that intervention to occur.

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