Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups

[1]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism , 1995 .

[2]  D. Moreno,et al.  Two Problems in Applying Ljung's Projection Algorithms to the Analysis of Decentralized Learning , 1994 .

[3]  J. Kagel,et al.  Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders , 1993 .

[4]  Robert E. Dorsey,et al.  The voluntary contributions mechanism with real time revisions , 1992 .

[5]  James Andreoni,et al.  Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments , 1991 .

[6]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games , 1991 .

[7]  J. Andreoni.  Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence , 1989, Journal of Political Economy.

[8]  James Andreoni,et al.  Why free ride?: Strategies and learning in public goods experiments , 1988 .

[9]  H. Rosenthal,et al.  Private incentives in social dilemmas: The effects of incomplete information and altruism , 1988 .

[10]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism , 1988 .

[11]  Charles R. Plott,et al.  Public goods provision in an experimental environment , 1985 .

[12]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma , 1982 .

[13]  G. Marwell,et al.  Economists free ride, does anyone else? : Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV , 1981 .

[14]  G. Marwell,et al.  Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem , 1980, American Journal of Sociology.

[15]  G. Marwell,et al.  Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem , 1979, American Journal of Sociology.

[16]  James Andreoni,et al.  A Coevolutionary Model Of Free Riding Behavior: Replicator Dtnamics As An Explanaton Of The Experimental Results , 1990 .

[17]  Daniel Kahneman,et al.  Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics , 1986 .

[18]  Vernon L. Smith,et al.  Expected Revenue in Discriminative and Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions , 1985 .

[19]  Mark A Walker,et al.  The free rider problem: Experimental evidence , 1984 .

[20]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations , 1984 .