The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the relationships between financial structures and corporate governance on the one hand, and corporate employment systems, particularly female employment, on the other. We tested two hypotheses regarding governance and female employment. The first is that the long-term employment system is changing due to strengthened governance by investors, and that the resulting trend toward shortened terms of employment for full-time employees (FTEs) is working to the advantage of women. The second is that overall management efficiency is improving due to strengthened governance by investors, and as a result, the effective use of women's labor power is being promoted. The results of this empirical analysis provide some support, albeit not very strong support, for the first hypothesis. The results obtained were consistent with the hypothesis that governance by institutional investors is resulting in shortened terms of employment for FTEs, and thus is promoting the employment of women, but the correlation between shortened terms of employment and female employment was not very strong. By contrast, the second hypothesis was strongly supported by the data. The evidence showed that companies with stronger governance by institutional investors are involved in positive action and have many female FTEs and managers.
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