The Politics of Property Rights: Industry

[1]  Allen M. Parkman,et al.  Spatial Monopoly, Non-Zero Profits and Entry Deterrence: The Case of Cement , 1983 .

[2]  Gregory Clark,et al.  Why Isn't the Whole World Developed? Lessons from the Cotton Mills , 1987, The Journal of Economic History.

[3]  Douglass C. North,et al.  Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England , 1989, The Journal of Economic History.

[4]  Kenneth L. Sokoloff,et al.  Was the transition from the artisanal shop to the nonmechanized factory associated with gains in efficiency?: Evidence from the U.S. Manufacturing censuses of 1820 and 1850 , 1984 .

[5]  R. Veugelers.  REPUTATION AS A MECHANISM AllEVIATING OPPORTUNISTIC HOST GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR AGAINST MNEs , 1993 .

[6]  Naomi R. Lamoreaux.  Insider lending: Frontmatter , 1994 .

[7]  S. Haber.  Assessing the Obstacles to Industrialisation: The Mexican Economy, 1830–1940 , 1992, Journal of Latin American Studies.

[8]  Naomi R. Lamoreaux.  Insider Lending by Naomi R. Lamoreaux , 1994 .

[9]  Jeffrey Bortz.  “Without Any More Law Than Their Own Caprice”: Cotton Textile Workers and the Challenge to Factory Authority During the Mexican Revolution , 1997, International Review of Social History.

[10]  Roger G. Noll,et al.  STRUCTURE AND PROCESS, POLITICS AND POLICY: ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF AGENCIES , 1989 .

[11]  Sandra Kuntz Ficker.  Economic Backwardness and Firm Strategy: An American Railroad Corporation in Nineteenth-Century Mexico , 2000 .

[12]  Thomas Schwartz,et al.  Congressional Oversight Over-looked: Police Patrol versus Fire Alarms , 1984 .

[13]  S. Haber,et al.  The Rate of Growth of Productivity in Mexico, 1850–1933: Evidence from the Cotton Textile Industry , 1998, Journal of Latin American Studies.

[14]  Noel Maurer.  Banks and Entrepreneurs in Porfirian Mexico: Inside Exploitation or Sound Business Strategy? , 1999, Journal of Latin American Studies.

[15]  S. Haber,et al.  Political Instability And Economic Performance: Evidence from Revolutionary Mexico , 1998, World Politics.

[16]  Douglass C. North,et al.  Empirical studies in institutional change , 1996 .

[17]  M. Olson.  Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. , 1993 .

[18]  T. Skocpol,et al.  States and social revolutions : a comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China , 1979 .

[19]  R. Porter,et al.  NONCOOPERATIVE COLLUSION UNDER IMPERFECT PRICE INFORMATION , 1984 .

[20]  S. Haber.  Industrial Concentration and the Capital Markets: A Comparative Study of Brazil, Mexico, and the United States, 1830–1930 , 1991, The Journal of Economic History.

[21]  Pablo T. Spiller,et al.  Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Contents , 1996 .

[22]  A. Greif.  Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders , 1989, The Journal of Economic History.

[23]  Barry R. Weingast,et al.  Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives , 1997 .

[24]  William K. Meyers.  Pancho Villa and the Multinationals: United States Mining Interests in Villista Mexico, 1913–1915 , 1991, Journal of Latin American Studies.

[25]  C. I. Jones,et al.  Productivity across industries and countries : time series theory and evidence , 1996 .

[26]  R. Barro,et al.  Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy , 1983 .

[27]  S. Peltzman.  Toward a More General Theory of Regulation , 1976, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[28]  John H. Coatsworth.  Obstacles to Economic Growth in Nineteenth-Century Mexico , 1978 .

[29]  Jeffrey A. Weldon.  Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico , 1997 .

[30]  B. Klein,et al.  Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process , 1978, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[31]  Hilton L. Root.  Tying the King's Hands , 1989 .

[32]  H. Tobler.  CHAPTER SIXTEEN. Peasants and the Shaping of the Revolutionary State, 1910-40 , 1988 .

[33]  Andrei Shleifer,et al.  Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution , 1993, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[34]  N. Campos,et al.  Who is Afraid of Political Instability , 2002 .

[35]  Barry R. Weingast,et al.  Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.

[36]  Barry R. Weingast.  The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law , 1997, American Political Science Review.

[37]  A. Alesina,et al.  Political Instability and Economic Growth , 1999 .

[38]  K. T. Poole,et al.  Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power , 1990, World Politics.

[39]  Coralia Gutiérrez Gutiérrez Álvarez.  Experiencias contrastadas: industrialización y conflictos en los textiles del centro-oriente de México, 1884-1917 , 2000 .