VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism: general framework for constructing iterative combinatorial auction mechanisms
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Makoto Yokoo | Taiki Todo | Atsushi Iwasaki | Miao Yao | Etsushi Fujita | M. Yokoo | Atsushi Iwasaki | Taiki Todo | Etsushi Fujita | Miao Yao
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