The institutional environment for infrastructure investment

The empirical evidence that links political institutions to economic outcomes has grown dramatically in recent years. However, virtually all of this analysis is undertaken using data from the past three decades. This paper extends this empirical framework by performing a two-century long historical analysis of the determinants of infrastructure investment in a panel of over 100 countries. The results demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

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