论文信息 - Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Characterization of all equilibria of nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information, in the standard one-sided information case. Informally, each such equilibrium is described by a sequence of communications between the players (consisting of information transmission and coordination), leading to some individually rational agreement. Formally, the concept of a bi-martingale is introduced.

Sergiu Hart | S. Hart

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