Strange Gravity: Toward a Unified Theory of Joint Warfighting

Abstract : The problem is, valid but incompatible service theories of operational warfighting inhibit rather than promote jointness. One cause of this problem is the joint definition of the center of gravity, which is vague and ineffective. This monograph tests a possible solution by asking, should the United States Armed Forces adopt the unified center of gravity framework proposed by Dr. Joe Strange as an element of operational design? The hypothesis is: the framework reconciles the service theories of operational warfighting while preserving their core principles and is an effective analytical tool to achieve success in full spectrum operations. By modifying the definition of critical vulnerability, the framework was consistent with the service theories of operational art, maneuver-warfare, air warfare, and naval warfare. It was an effective analytical tool to achieve success in Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, and Joint Guardian. Therefore, the United States Armed Forces should adopt the modified center of gravity framework as an element of operational design. It is the nucleus of a unified theory of joint warfighting that resolves the paradox of valid but incompatible service theories to achieve unified action in operational design.

[1]  Michael Ignatieff.  Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond , 2000 .

[2]  Robert S. Bolia.  Storm over Iraq: Airpower and the Gulf War , 2005 .

[3]  J. Pulido.  A Brief History of Time From the Big Bang to Black Holes , 1988 .

[4]  Robert J. Art,et al.  The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics , 1988 .

[5]  Peter Paret,et al.  CHAPTER FOUR. Closer Definition of the Military Objective: The Defeat of the Enemy , 1989 .

[6]  Michael Mandelbaum,et al.  A Perfect Failure: NATO's War against Yugoslavia , 1999 .

[7]  Thomas G. Weiss,et al.  The Politics of Rescue: Yugoslavia's Wars and the Humanitarian Impulse , 1997, Ethics & International Affairs.

[8]  S. A. Swarztrauber.  On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. , 1983 .

[9]  Richard West,et al.  Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia , 1994 .

[10]  Robert R. Leonhard,et al.  The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and Airland Battle , 1955 .

[11]  Raymond Aron,et al.  Clausewitz, philosopher of war , 1983 .

[12]  Barton C. Hacker,et al.  The Transformation of War , 1992 .

[13]  Edward N. Luttwak,et al.  Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace , 1988 .

[14]  Eliot A. Cohen,et al.  The Mystique of U.S. Air Power , 1994 .

[15]  Harvey M. Sapolsky,et al.  Casualties, Technology, and America''s Future Wars , 1996 .

[16]  SARATOGA SPRINGS.  OFFICIAL STATEMENT , 1854, Association medical journal.

[17]  David Fromkin.  Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality On The Balkan Battlefields , 1999 .

[18]  Wesley K. Clark.  Military Contingency Operations: The Lessons of Political-Military Coordination , 1975 .

[19]  E. Cohen,et al.  Bombing to win : air power and coercion in war , 1996 .

[20]  John A Warden,et al.  The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat , 1988 .

[21]  Peter Paret,et al.  Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times , 1976 .

[22]  A. Beyerchen.  Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War , 1992 .

[23]  Carl von Clausewitz,et al.  Historical and political writings , 1992 .

[24]  G. K. Chandler.  A National Security Strategy for a New Century , 1998 .

[25]  Warren Zimmermann,et al.  The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia , 1995 .

[26]  Rebecca Dame West,et al.  Black lamb and grey falcon: a journey through Yugoslavia , 1982 .

[27]  Robert Legvold,et al.  Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War , 1995 .

[28]  David R. Mets.  The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists , 1999 .

[29]  J. Simpson,et al.  The aftermath of the Gulf War , 1992 .

[30]  Robert M. Cassidy,et al.  War in the Information Age , 2010 .

[31]  David Sobek.  The Causes of War , 2008 .

[32]  Chris Hedges,et al.  Kosovo's Next Masters? , 1999 .

[33]  Robert L. Pfaltzgraff,et al.  The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War , 1992 .

[34]  James J Schneider,et al.  Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity , 1987 .

[35]  L. Brown.  :The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory , 2004 .

[36]  Kenneth N. Waltz,et al.  Theory of International Politics , 1979 .

[37]  L. L. Farrar.  Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power , 1993 .

[38]  Richard E. Simpkin.  Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare , 1985 .

[39]  John B. Saxman.  The Concept of Center of Gravity: Does it Have Utility in Joint Doctrine and Campaign Planning? , 1992 .

[40]  Michael E. O'Hanlon,et al.  Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo , 1999 .

[41]  G. C. de Nooy,et al.  The Clausewitzian dictum and the future of Western military strategy , 1997 .

[42]  Timothy L. Thomas.  The Age of the New Persuaders , 1997 .

[43]  Jerry Fowler.  Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions , 2002 .

[44]  D. Doder,et al.  Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant , 1999 .

[45]  Richard D. Hooker,et al.  Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology. , 1994 .

[46]  Daniel Silander.  United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo , 2009 .

[47]  Charles K. Hyde.  Casualty Aversion: Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military Officers , 2000 .

[48]  Allan Little,et al.  Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation , 1997 .

[49]  Harry G. Summers.  On strategy II : a critical analysis of the Gulf war , 1992 .

[50]  T. Judah,et al.  Kosovo: War and Revenge , 2000 .

[51]  T. G. Carpenter,et al.  NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War , 2000 .

[52]  Javier Solana,et al.  NATO's Success in Kosovo , 1999 .

[53]  Peter W. Rodman,et al.  The Fallout from Kosovo , 1999 .

[54]  Phillip S. Meilinger.  The paths of heaven the evolution of airpower theory , 1997 .

[55]  Myron J. Griswold.  Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy's Center of Gravity , 2012 .

[56]  S. V. Evera.  Hypotheses on Nationalism and War , 1994 .

[57]  R. Kaplan,et al.  Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History , 1993 .

[58]  Heinz Guderian.  Achtung-Panzer!: The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential , 1937 .

[59]  Liddell Hart,et al.  Revolution in Warfare. , 1948 .

[60]  John E Shephard.  On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant? , 1990 .

[61]  Daniel R. Headrick,et al.  Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age , 1988 .

[62]  Joseph S. Nye,et al.  America's Information Edge , 1996 .

[63]  Barry R. Posen,et al.  Military Responses to Refugee Disasters , 1996, International Security.

[64]  R. Holbrooke.  How to end a war , 1999 .

[65]  Noel Malcolm,et al.  Kosovo: A Short History , 1994 .

[66]  Stephen Biddle,et al.  Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict , 1996, International Security.

[67]  Tom Fedyszyn,et al.  Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo , 2002 .

[68]  Christopher Bassford,et al.  Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity , 1995, The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters.

[69]  Steven Metz,et al.  Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy , 2013 .

[70]  William S. Lind,et al.  Maneuver Warfare Handbook , 1985 .

[71]  Richard A. Chilcoat.  Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders , 1995 .