Specializations and Generalizations of the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game

Let be given a graph G = ( V , E ) whose edge set is partitioned into a set R of red edges and a set B of blue edges, and assume that red edges are weighted and form a spanning tree of G. Then, the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree (StackMST) problem is that of pricing (i.e., weighting) the blue edges in such a way that the total weight of the blue edges selected in a minimum spanning tree of the resulting graph is maximized. StackMST is known to be APX-hard already when the number of distinct red edge weights is 2. In this paper we analyze some meaningful specializations and generalizations of StackMST, which shed some more light on the computational complexity of the problem. More precisely, we first show that if G is restricted to be complete, then the following holds: (i) if there are only 2 distinct red edge weights, then the problem can be solved optimally (this contrasts with the corresponding APX-hardness of the general problem); (ii) otherwise, the problem can be approximated within 7 / 4 + ? , for any ? 0 . Afterwards, we define a natural extension of StackMST, namely that in which blue edges are associated with a non-negative activation cost, and it is given a global activation budget that can be used (and must not be exceeded) in order to activate a subset of blue edges to be priced. Here, after showing that the very same approximation ratio as that of the original problem can be achieved, we prove that if the spanning tree of red edges can be rooted so as that any root-leaf path contains at most h edges, then the problem admits a ( 2 h + ? ) -approximation algorithm, for any ? 0 .

[1]  Gwenaël Joret Stackelberg network pricing is hard to approximate , 2011, Networks.

[2]  Jean Cardinal,et al.  The Stackelberg minimum spanning tree game on planar and bounded-treewidth graphs , 2009, Workshop on Internet and Network Economics.

[3]  Jean Cardinal,et al.  The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game , 2007, Algorithmica.

[4]  Patrick Briest,et al.  Improved Hardness of Approximation for Stackelberg Shortest-Path Pricing , 2009, WINE.

[5]  P. Marcotte,et al.  A bilevel model of taxation and its application to optimal highway pricing , 1996 .

[6]  Martin Hoefer,et al.  On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers , 2009, WINE.

[7]  P. Marcotte,et al.  An approximation algorithm for Stackelberg network pricing , 2005 .

[8]  Patrice Marcotte,et al.  An approximation algorithm for Stackelberg network pricing , 2004, Networks.

[9]  Viggo Kann,et al.  Some APX-completeness results for cubic graphs , 2000, Theor. Comput. Sci..

[10]  Stan P. M. van Hoesel,et al.  An overview of Stackelberg pricing in networks , 2008, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[11]  Guido Proietti,et al.  Hardness of an Asymmetric 2-player Stackelberg Network Pricing Game , 2020, Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex..

[12]  Martin Hoefer,et al.  Stackelberg Network Pricing Games , 2008, STACS.

[13]  Alexander Grigoriev,et al.  Pricing Network Edges to Cross a River , 2004, WAOA.

[14]  Guido Proietti,et al.  Computational Aspects of a 2-Player Stackelberg Shortest Paths Tree Game , 2008, WINE.

[15]  Martin Hoefer,et al.  On stackelberg pricing with computationally bounded customers , 2012, Networks.

[16]  Robert E. Tarjan,et al.  Sensitivity Analysis of Minimum Spanning Trees and Shortest Path Trees , 1982, Inf. Process. Lett..

[17]  H. Stackelberg,et al.  Marktform und Gleichgewicht , 1935 .