Revisiting the model of credit cycles with Good and Bad projects

We revisit the model of endogenous credit cycles by Matsuyama (2013, Sections 2–4). First, we show that the same dynamical system that generates the equilibrium trajectory is obtained under a much simpler setting. Such a streamlined presentation should help to highlight the mechanism through which financial frictions cause instability and recurrent fluctuations. Then, we discuss the nature of fluctuations in greater detail when the final goods production function is Cobb–Douglas. For example, the unique steady state possesses corridor stability (locally stable but globally unstable) for empirically relevant parameter values. This also means that, when a parameter change causes the steady state to lose its local stability, its effects are catastrophic and irreversible so that even a small, temporary change in the financial friction could have large, permanent effects on volatility. Other features of the dynamics include an immediate transition from the stable steady state to a stable asymmetric cycle of period n≥3, along which n−1≥2 consecutive periods of gradual expansion are followed by one period of sharp downturn, as well as to a robust chaotic attractor. These results demonstrate the power of the skew-tent map as a tool for analyzing a regime-switching dynamic economic model.

[1]  A. Banerjee,et al.  Dualism and macroeconomic volatility , 1999 .

[2]  W. Lewis,et al.  Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises , 1979 .

[3]  Roger B. Myerson Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents , 2014, J. Econ. Theory.

[4]  K. Matsuyama,et al.  Aggregate Implications of Credit Market Imperfections [with Comments and Discussion] , 2007, NBER Macroeconomics Annual.

[5]  B. Bernanke,et al.  Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations , 1988 .

[6]  Minsky,et al.  The Financial-Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behavior of the Economy , 1979 .

[7]  Jess Benhabib,et al.  Chaos: Significance, Mechanism, and Economic Applications , 1989 .

[8]  L. Gardini,et al.  Superstable credit cycles and U-sequence , 2014 .

[9]  Kiminori Matsuyama,et al.  Growing Through Cycles , 1999 .

[10]  J. Benhabib,et al.  Some New Results on the Dynamics of the Generalized Tobin Model , 1981 .

[11]  M. Schanz,et al.  Continuous and Discontinuous Piecewise-Smooth One-Dimensional Maps: Invariant Sets and Bifurcation Structures , 2014 .

[12]  Alan M. Taylor,et al.  Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870-2008 , 2009 .

[13]  F. Melese,et al.  Unscrambling Chaos Through Thick and Thin , 1986 .

[14]  Laura Gardini,et al.  Growing through chaotic intervals , 2008, J. Econ. Theory.

[15]  Axel Leijonhufvud,et al.  Effective Demand Failures , 1973 .

[16]  Alberto Martín Endogenous Credit Cycles , 2004 .

[17]  Robert N. McCauley,et al.  Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises , 1979 .

[18]  L. Gardini,et al.  Bifurcation structure in the skew tent map and its application as a border collision normal form , 2016 .

[19]  J. Córdoba,et al.  Credit Cycles , 2003 .

[20]  L. Gardini,et al.  Chaos in a Model of Credit Cycles with Good and Bad Projects , 2014 .

[21]  Costas Azariadis,et al.  Financial Intermediation and Regime Switching in Business Cycles , 1998 .

[22]  An Anatomy of Credit Booms: Evidence from Macro Aggregates and Micro Data , 2008 .

[23]  G. Favara Agency Problems and Endogenous Investment Fluctuations , 2012 .

[24]  K. Matsuyama,et al.  Credit Traps and Credit Cycles , 2007 .

[25]  An Anatomy of Credit Booms: Evidence from Macro Aggregates and Micro Data , 2008 .

[26]  A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles , 2012, Journal of Political Economy.

[27]  J. Tirole The theory of corporate finance , 2006 .

[28]  P. Reichlin,et al.  Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle , 2004 .

[29]  K. Matsuyama The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: An Inquiry into the Causes and Nature of Credit Cycles , 2013 .