Models for conflict resolution in ecosystem management

Abstract Tools developed in the fields of decision analysis and game theory that have potential for use in public sector conflict resolution are reviewed. The strengths and weaknesses, as well as the axioms defining principles of fairness, are examined for multiobjective optimization, Nash and Nash–Harsanyi solutions, voting models, and the Shapley value. The case of conflict between stakeholders over proposed oil and gas leasing on National Forest System lands is presented as a sample application. We conclude that the Shapley value is the appropriate approach for determining the “fairness” of alternative conflict solutions, at least in those situations where cardinal utilities can be estimated.

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