New voter verification scheme using pre-encrypted ballots

In order for remote electronic voting systems to be reliable, voter verification is an essential feature. Most pre-encrypted ballot schemes proposed to date allow voters to verify that their votes have been properly recorded in the voting server. Such verification makes it possible to detect manipulation of the vote in the voting terminal or during its transmission. However, these schemes do not allow voters to verify that their votes have been accurately included in the counting process. In this paper, we describe a new proposal that solves this problem. Under the proposed scheme, voters can verify that their votes have been properly recorded, and they also have the opportunity to individually verify that their votes have been properly included in the counting process. Voter verification is thus achieved in two different contexts: proper recording and accurate counting.

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