Interpreting actions by attributing compositional desires

We cannot see others’ mental states, so we infer them by watching how people behave. Bayesian inference in a model of rational action – called inverse planning – captures how humans infer desires from observable actions. These models represent desires as simple associations between agents and world states. In this paper we show that by representing desires as probabilistic programs, an inverse planning model can infer complex desires underlying complex behaviors—desires with temporal and logical structure, which can be fulfilled in different ways. Our model, which combines basic desires via logical primitives, is inspired by recent probabilistic grammarbased models of concept learning. Through an experiment where we vary behaviors parametrically, we show that our model predicts with high accuracy how people infer complex desires. Our work sheds light on the representations underlying mental states, and paves the way towards algorithms that can reason about others’ minds as we do.

[1]  Joshua B. Tenenbaum,et al.  Learning What is Where from Social Observations , 2012, CogSci.

[2]  Noah D. Goodman,et al.  Bootstrapping in a language of thought: A formal model of numerical concept learning , 2012, Cognition.

[3]  A. Endress,et al.  The Social Sense: Susceptibility to Others’ Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults , 2010, Science.

[4]  Noah D. Goodman,et al.  Concepts in a Probabilistic Language of Thought , 2014 .

[5]  D. Dennett The Intentional Stance. , 1987 .

[6]  Chris L. Baker,et al.  Action understanding as inverse planning , 2009, Cognition.

[7]  Chris L. Baker,et al.  Rational quantitative attribution of beliefs, desires and percepts in human mentalizing , 2017, Nature Human Behaviour.

[8]  Charles Kemp,et al.  How to Grow a Mind: Statistics, Structure, and Abstraction , 2011, Science.

[9]  Joshua B. Tenenbaum,et al.  The Naïve Utility Calculus: Computational Principles Underlying Commonsense Psychology , 2016, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[10]  Thomas L. Griffiths,et al.  A Rational Analysis of Rule-Based Concept Learning , 2008, Cogn. Sci..

[11]  G. Csibra,et al.  Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action , 2003, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[12]  Christopher G. Lucas,et al.  The Child as Econometrician: A Rational Model of Preference Understanding in Children , 2014, PloS one.

[13]  A. Gopnik,et al.  Words, thoughts, and theories , 1997 .

[14]  Martin L. Puterman,et al.  Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming , 1994 .