A formal account of opportunism based on the situation calculus

In social interactions, it is common for individuals to possess different amounts of knowledge about a specific transaction, and those who are more knowledgeable might perform opportunistic behavior to others in their interest, which promotes their value but demotes others’ value. Such a typical social behavior is called opportunistic behavior (opportunism). In this paper, we propose a formal account of opportunism based on the situation calculus. We first propose a model of opportunism that only considers a single action between two agents, and then extend it to multiple actions and incorporate social context in the model. A simple example of selling a broken cup is used to illustrate our models. Through our models, we can have a thorough understanding of opportunism.

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