论文信息 - Formal utilitarianism and range voting

Formal utilitarianism and range voting

In formal utilitarian voting, each voter assigns a numerical value to each alternative, and society chooses the alternative with the highest total value. Range voting is similar, except that each voter’s values are constrained to lie in the interval [0,1]. We characterize these rules via the axioms of anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, overwhelming majority, and two novel conditions: maximal expressiveness, and an absence of “minority overrides”.

Marcus Pivato

[1] Amrita Dhillon. Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism , 1998 .

[2] L. Fuchs. Partially Ordered Algebraic Systems , 2011 .

[3] Marcus Pivato,et al. Variable-population voting rules , 2013 .

[4] Walter Bossert,et al. Utilitarianism and the Theory of Justice , 2002 .

[5] H. Young. Social Choice Scoring Functions , 1975 .

[7] Peter C. Fishburn,et al. Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof , 1978 .

[8] H. P. Young,et al. A Note on Preference Aggregation , 1974 .

[9] Yongsheng Xu,et al. A general scoring rule , 2012, Math. Soc. Sci..

[10] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption , 1993 .

[11] Ariel Rubinstein,et al. A further characterization of Borda ranking method , 1981 .

[12] J. H. Smith. AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES WITH VARIABLE ELECTORATE , 1973 .

[13] Carlos Alós-Ferrer,et al. A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting , 2006, Soc. Choice Welf..

[14] H. P. Young,et al. An axiomatization of Borda's rule , 1974 .

[15] Jean-François Laslier,et al. Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections , 2013, Social Choice and Welfare.