Borda and Condorcet: Some Distance Results

This paper provides a distance based analysis of the Borda rule with respect to Condorcet’s criterion. It shows that the minimal Condorcet consistency present in the Borda rule, whenever a Condorcet winner (the alternative that wins against every other alternative in a pairwise contest) exists, disappears in the case of voting cycles. First, it is shown that for certain preference profiles the Borda winner is furthest from being a Condorcet winner. Second, it is shown that there exist preference profiles for which the Borda winner is closest from being a Condorcet loser (the alternative that loses against every other alternative in a pairwise contest).

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